Many techniques have been proposed for automatic patch generation and the overwhelming majority of them rely on the quality of test suites to prove the correctness of the patches that they generate. However, the quality of test suites is usually undesirable and hence the quality of the patches is ill-suited for security vulnerabilities. To address this, we propose an approach that generates patches by following the proved working strategy utilized by human developers in fixing security vulnerabilities, which relies on a sound analysis of the nature of a vulnerability rather than the quality of test suites for the correctness of the patches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fixing security vulnerabilities in a timely manner is critical to protect software users from potential security attacks and software vendors from losing user confidence. A recent study has shown that developing correct patches is often the bottleneck of the process of fixing security vulnerabilities [25] . However, current patch generation techniques aim to cover a wide range of software defects, not just security vulnerabilities. As a result, they can afford to be unsound since not being able to produce a correct patch is no worse than not producing any patch at all. To ensure that a grossly incorrect patch is not deployed, candidate patches generate are often run through a battery of ad-hoc functionality tests and if they pass the tests, they are regarded as correct. Unfortunately, this ad-hoc way of evaluating patch correctness is unreliable and can result in patches that do not fix the underlying defect [38] . Such an approach is not suitable for automatically patching security vulnerabilities, where we must high assurance that the patch addresses the vulnerability so that it is no longer exploitable.
To address this, we propose Senx, a sound patch generation tool that generates source code patches for vulnerabilities in three steps. First, the Senx generates predicate that if evaluated to true, means that the vulnerability is about to be exploited. Second, Senx places the predicate at a location where it can be evaluated. Finally, Senx identifies error handling code in the application it can call when the predicate evaluates to true. Senx only covers defects that can be repaired by transferring execution to error handling code when inputs matching a certain predicate are received along a certain program path. While this limits the range of defects Senx can address, it is a good fit for a range of security vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, integer overflows and pointer arithmetic errors, which together make up a large number of vulnerabilities found in software binaries today. Further, Senx aims to be sound-if it cannot correctly complete the three steps above, Senx generates no patch at all. p r i n t f ( "%s \ n " , o u t p u t ) ; 38 f r e e ( o u t p u t ) ; 39 r e t u r n 0 ; 40 } 41 42 b a r ( char * s r c , i n t s i z e , i n t c o l s , char * d e s t ) { 43 char * p = d e s t ; 44 char * q = s r c ; 45 w h i l e ( q < s r c + s i z e ) { 46 f o r ( u n s i g n e d j = 0 ; j < c o l s ; j ++) 47 * ( p ++) = * ( q ++) ; 48 * ( p ++) = ' \ n ' ; 49 } 50 * p = ' \ 0 ' ; 51 } 52 53 i n t main ( i n t a r g c , char * a r g v [ ] ) { 54 c o n s t char * i n = a r g v [ 1 ] ; 55 r e t u r n f o o ( i n , s t r l e n ( i n ) ) ; 56 } Listing 1. A typical buffer overflow vulnerability with a patch. The patch consists of the lines prefixed with '+'.
We illustrate the challenges with a simplified example based on buffer overflow vulnerability [13] in libav, an audio/video library used by many popular media players, in Listing 1. The buffer overflow takes place at line 47 in function bar when the number of rows and the number of columns specified in the input is less than the actual size of the input data copied into the array. The first challenge is to generate the correct predicate that can extract both the correct size of the buffer that p points to and the actual amount of data copied, determined by the number of loop iterations that will occur inside bar. The second challenge is placing the patch. As we can see, the size of the array is computed in one function foo_malloc, while the number of array iterations is computed in another function bar. Thus, the only place where these two values can be compared in a predicate is in their common caller foo. Further the expressions for both array size and number of loop iterations must be translated into variables available in the scope of the caller-i.e. x * y+1 for the array size in foo_malloc must be translated into rows * (cols+1)+1 in foo. Finally, the last challenge is to generate the correct recovery action to be taken if the if the predicate protecting the program evaluates to true, which in this case, is returning -1 to the caller. A simple solution might have been to terminate the program immediately as adopted by popular vulnerability mitigation techniques such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Control Flow Integrity (CFI), and non-executable stacks (DEP) [17] , [34] , [39] , [49] . However, this solution still results in denial of service. Senx calls error handling code in a way similar to previous work [20] , [25] to abort the current request and return the application to a known state.
To overcome these challenges Senx proposes and evaluates several new program analysis techniques. To generate predicates involving complex loop expressions, Senx employs loop cloning and access range analysis. To place patches in the correct scope, Senx employs symbolic translation, that enables expressions to be translated into the scope of a function's caller. Previous patch generation tools that do not employ symbolic translation, can only generate patches for defects where all values involved in the defect are available in the scope of a single function [26] , [30] , [33] , [36] .
Our main contributions in this paper are summarized as follows:
• Symbolic translation A novel symbolic expression translation technique that allows predicates to move across procedural boundaries in code. • Loop cloning, an original technique that safely clones code to compute the number of loop iterations. • Access range analysis, an algorithm that recognizes the range of memory access, in the form of symbolic expressions that can handle memory access enclosed in nested loops. • Senx, a prototype implementation of our approach, and its evaluation on a several different real-world programs including the PHP interpreter, lighttpd web server, the Redis key-value database, the Sqlite embedded database, and coreutils.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we first present the definitions relevant to the problem that our approach addresses. We then give an overview of our approach and illustrate it by going through the example code. Finally, we discuss the safety of the patches.
A. Problem Definition
The goal of Senx is to synthesize sound source code patches for integer overflow and buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Figure 1 shows the workflow of our approach. It takes as input the source code of an application and an input that triggers a the vulnerable code in the application. The input need not exploit the vulnerability, but has to trigger the vulnerability in such a way that it is detectable (it crashes the program for example). Given this, Senx will generate a patch that is sound. We more precisely define the types of vulnerabilities Senx can currently handle below, as well as what a Senx patch is and what it means to be sound.
Integer overflow. An integer overflow occurs when an integer value overflows, meaning that a large value is increased and becomes a small value, or conversely when a small value is decreased and becomes a large value. Integer overflows usually become vulnerabilities when the integer is subsequently used as an index into an array, which enables an attacker to corrupt or access arbitrary memory locations. However, Senx detects integer overflows when they occur and is independent on how they are used subsequently.
Linear Buffer overflow. A linear buffer overflow occurs when series of memory accesses traversing a buffer in a loop crosses from an allocated buffer to a memory location outside of the buffer. We use the term buffer in the broad sense to refer to either a bounded memory region (such as a struct or other object) or an array. The memory access can be the result of an array dereference or pointer dereference.
Non-linear Buffer overflow. A non-linear buffer overflow occurs when a memory access is computed off a base pointer, and exceeds the upper bound of the object the base pointer points to. Some causes of non-linear buffer overflows include an incorrect calculation of an array index or a casts of a pointer to the the incorrect object type. In general, a non-linear buffer overflow is the result of accessing memory via a bad address or offset. As a result, we also call non-linear buffer overflows as bad offsets.
Patch. Senx generates patches in one of two forms: a single if statement checks a predicate that evaluates to true if and only if the vulnerability is about to be triggered and an added data type cast to an evaluation such as addition or multiplication that can cause integer overflows. In the first form, if the predicate evaluates to true, control is transferred to error handling code that avoid executing the vulnerable code, treats the current input as an error, and returns the application back to a known state. In the second form, the cast avoids integer overflows by ensuring that the evaluation is performed using a correct data type.
Soundness. We say a patch is sound if it prevents execution of the vulnerable code if and only on inputs that will trigger the vulnerability is given to the program. In other words, the patch predicate must only evaluate to true on vulnerability-triggering inputs while evaluating to false on all other inputs. Senx's soundness assumes that the off-the-shelf pointer alias analyses it uses is precise, as it depends on knowing the values of variables at every point along the execution path. While Senx could use other pointer analyses, all static pointer analyses have the potential to be precise under some circumstances, which impacts the soundness of Senx patches under those circumstances. We discuss this limitation in Section II-D.
B. Patch Generation
Senx generates a patch in the following 4 steps. First, based on a concolic execution of the program with the vulnerabilitytriggering input, Senx classifies the vulnerability into one of the 3 categories it supports: an integer overflow, a linear buffer overflow, or a non-linear buffer overflow. Second, based on the type of vulnerability, Senx generates the patch predicate that will detect if the input given to the program will trigger the vulnerability. Third, Senx places the predicate at a point in the source code where it can be evaluated. Finally, Senx finds and calls error handling code from the application if the predicate evaluates to true. In each of steps one to three, Senx will not generate a patch if it cannot guarantee soundness. For the fourth step, soundness is not involved since the error handling code is only triggered if the predicate evaluates to true. We now describe each of the four steps in more detail using the example from Listing 1.
Vulnerability classification. Senx first classifies the vulnerability using a concolic execution of the program with a vulnerability-triggering input. During the concolic execution, the Senx symbolic expression builder generates symbolic expressions for program variables. Using these expressions, Senx can then assemble them into more complex symbolic expressions that represent the size of memory allocations and the location of memory accesses. In this way, Senx can symbolically represent the upper and lower bounds of all memory objects.
Based on the information collected from the concolic execution, it performs the following classification. If it detects that any variable had an integer overflow, then it classifies the vulnerability as an integer overflow. If it is not an integer overflow, Senx inspects the symbols collected during symbolic execution to see if an out-of-bounds memory access outside of an allocated region occurred. If the out-of-bounds access occurs in a loop and is dependent on the number of iterations of the loop, it is classified as a linear buffer overflow. Otherwise, Senx checks if the out-of-bounds access is an offset of a base pointer, and classifies it as a non linear buffer overflow if it is so. If the vulnerability does not meet any of these definitions, then Senx does not generate a patch because it cannot guarantee the soundness of the patch.
In Listing 1, Senx detects that the faulty memory access occurs when the pointer p is dereferenced and written to on line 47. Since the access occurs inside a loop, and p is incremented on each loop iteration, Senx classifies this vulnerability as a buffer overflow.
Buffer Overflows. Senx generates patches in the first form for buffer overflows. For linear buffer overflows Senx generates a patch that checks whether the memory access can exceed the upper range of the buffer. While Senx could try to evaluate this predicate inside the loop, there are two reasons it does not do this. First, evaluating the predicate inside the loop every time would increase the overhead of the check. Second, it might not be possible to evaluate the predicate inside the loop because the size of the buffer cannot be computed. For example, in Listing 1, the size of buffer dest cannot be computed from the variables inside the scope of bar.
Instead, Senx generates a predicate that checks if the memory access range of the loop can exceed the size of the buffer. To do this, Senx must compute the number of loop iterations, the amount the memory access is incremented per iteration and the size of the buffer. The number of iterations is computed using one of two methods that Senx supports: loop cloning and access range analysis, which we discuss in more detail in Section II-C. The other two components: the increment per iteration and size of the buffer are both computed symbolically from the Senx's concolic execution. Senx requires that the increment must be the same for each iteration, or predicate generation will fail and Senx will not produce a patch.
For non-linear buffer overflows, the predicate checks whether the out-of-bounds memory access is greater than the upper bound of the base object it is accessing, which Senx extracts from the memory access' symbolic representation.
Senx may not be able to soundly generate in two cases. First, Senx must convince itself that it's symbolic analysis is complete. Because the symbolic representation of the predicate is computed from a concolic execution of the program along the vulnerable path, Senx conducts a static analysis to ensure that the reaching definition of each variable is unique to the executed path. If not, the predicate it computes will not be accurate for the other paths and Senx aborts. Second, the computation for some of the variables in the predicate may not be expressible in Senx symbolic theory. For example, the number of loop iterations may not be symbolically representable by Senx. In those cases, Senx also aborts and does not generate a patch.
In our example, Senx generates a predicate for a buffer overflow, which checks whether the number of loop iterations, (cols+1) * (size/cols), can exceed the size of the buffer p points to. Since the allocation for the buffer is in another function, Senx performs interprocedural analysis of arguments and parameters, to realize that in this execution, p points to dest, which is an alias output, and whose size is x * y + 1 as defined by its allocation in foo_malloc. Integer Overflows. Senx classifies integer overflows into two types: typical or non-typical. A typical integer overflow happens when a correct data type is used in a evaluation that can cause integer overflows. For example, two 32-bit integers are added to produce a 32-bit integer as their sum. A nontypical integer overflow happens when an incorrect data type is used in such evaluation. For example, two 32-bit integers are multiplied to produce a 64-bit integer as their product, but the multiplication is incorrectly performed using 32-bit instead of 64-bit.
To classify integer overflows, Senx checks how the result of an evaluation that can cause integer overflow is used. If the result is subsequently used in the same data type of the evaluation, Senx considers the integer overflow as typical integer overflow. Otherwise, Senx considers the integer overflow as non-typical integer overflow.
For a typical integer overflow, Senx also generates a patch in the first form as it does for a buffer overflow. Different from the patch geneated for a buffer overflow, the patch predicate for a typical integer overflow checks the result of an evaluation against the maximum integer that can be represented by the corresponding data type of the evaluation to detect overflows.
For a non-typical integer overflow, Senx generates a patch in the second form. The patch directly replaces the evaluation of incorrect data type with the same evaluation with the correct data type. It inserts a data type cast into the evaluation to ensure correct data type is used for the evaluation.
Predicate Placement. Senx then needs to select a location to place the predicate. Ideally, Senx tries to place the predicate in the same function scope as the vulnerability. However, as mentioned earlier, sometimes the predicate cannot be evaluated at the location when a vulnerability occurs and must be at a point in the program where all required symbols are in scope. For example, bcause the size of dest is x * y + 1 in the scope of foo_malloc, it cannot be evaluated in bar. As a result, Senx searches up the call stack for a context where all symbols in the predicate are available, and finds that foo is a common parent to both functions and that the necessary symbols can be translated using symbolic translation into the context of foo.
Within a function, Senx places the patch at the beginning of the function. This is to avoid resource leaks since if the predicate is triggered, the patch will not execute the rest of the function. If any memory was allocated or locks were acquired in the function, they would not be released properly. Places the patch at the beginning of the function avoids this.
C. Loop Analysis
Linear buffer overflows involve memory accesses that are mappable to a loop induction variable that represents the number of iterations the loop executes for. To determine whether a loop will overflow the buffer, Senx needs to symbolically compute the number of loop iterations a loop will execute for, map that to the access range and compare that with the size of the buffer being accessed.
In general, statically extracting the number of loop iterations is undecidable as it is reducible to the halting problem. As a result, Senx uses a dynamic method, which we call loop cloning to extract the number of iterations. The idea behind loop cloning is to use the same logic the program uses to execute the loop to compute the number of iterations. Performs a program slice of the loop into to keep all the loop logic, but remove any instructions that may have side effects (i.e. they modify memory or make system calls), and includes the cloned loop in the predicate to compute the number of iterations.
However, loop cloning cannot be used in cases where instructions that have side effects cannot be sliced away from the logic that computes the number of iterations. For example, the exit condition of a loop maybe require they dynamic allocation of a buffer with malloc, which can make system calls. As a result, such loops cannot be cloned. In such cases, Senx falls back to access range analysis. Access range analysis attempts to statically normalize the loop and then extract the number of iterations from the normalized form of the loop. Both loop cloning and access range analysis are described in more detail in Section III.
In our example, Senx recognizes that the vulnerable access on line 47 occurs in a nested loop. It starts by analyzing the inner loop, where it can apply access range analysis because the exit condition is a comparison between the loop induction variable j, and the loop bound cols. Because j starts at zero and is incremented by 1 on each iteration, the inner loop executes for cols iterations. The vulnerable memory access to p is of type char, meaning that it access a byte for each iteration and it is mappable to j. As a result, Senx computes the access range of the inner loop to be cols bytes. The analysis is recursively computed for the outer loop, to which access range analysis is also applicable based on the loop exit condition. It has induction variable q, which is incremented by cols on each iteration. Thus, the outer loop executes for size/cols iterations. On each iteration, p accesses cols bytes in the inner loop and an additional byte at line 48, totaling cols + 1 bytes for each iteration of the outer loop. Thus the total access range both loops is (cols + 1) * (size/cols). Finally, the predicate is generate which compares this with the size of the buffer p is writing into.
D. Limitations
Senx does not generate a patch if it cannot guarantee soundness. To summarize, there are 4 conditions under which Senx will not generate a patch: 1) the symbolic expression builder determines there may be other reaching definitions to variables involved in the predicate, 2) predicate generation fails because some variables cannot represented symbolically, usually because Senx is unable to determine the number of iterations for a complex loop, 3) Senx is unable to place the patch at a location where all variables in the predicate are in scope. In practice, these limitations arise in roughly 20% of cases -our evaluation shows that Senx is successful in patching 33 of the 42 vulnerabilities we evaluated in Section V.
Senx's other limitation is that to determine whether the symbolic variables over which it computes predicates have aliases, Senx uses the alias analysis provided by LLVM [7] to check whether any memory writes along the execution path from where a patch is to be placed until where a vulnerability manifests, e.g. buffer overflow occurs, can alias with any variables involved in a patch predicate. It follows all the function calls on the execution path and performs alias analysis in all the called functions. Senx treats the results of the pointer analysis as precise even though it might not be. If the pointer analysis is incorrect, Senx may generate an unsound patch. However, in our evaluation over 42 vulnerabilities, the imprecision of the pointer analysis never arose.
III. DESIGN
We now describe the major components of Senx in detail. We first describe the symbolic expression builder which builds symbolic expressions along the concolic execution of a target program. We then describre Senx's two loop analysis techniques: access range analysis and loop cloning, which generate symbolic expressions to represent the access range of the pointer for simple loops and complex loops respectively. Finally, we describe symbolic expression translation, which translates the symbolic expressions denoting the access range and the buffer range into a common scope.
A. Symbolic Expression Builder
We leverage concolic execution to build symbolic expressions used for synthesizing a patch for a target program. While we base our concolic execution engine on KLEE [18] , we do not use the symbolic representation that KLEE uses as it is heavily tied to maximizing path exploration, and does not store enough information to easily translate expressions back into source code to construct patches. As a result, we design our own symbolic representation as a sequence of pseudo instructions defined in Table I. The instructions include Load and Store memory access instructions, BinOp binary operations such as arithmetic operations and CmpOp comparison operations such as > and ≥, StructOp struct operations that access a field of a struct, ArrayOp array operations that access an element of an array, Allocate for local variable allocation, Branch for unconditional and conditional branches, Call for function calls and Ret for function returns. Each instruction can have an optional label denoted as label. The concolic execution uses a program counter that points to the current instruction, which is referred to as PC in the table. For each instruction presented in Column "Instruction", the concolic execution interprets it using the semantic operation indicated in Column "Semantic". The results of these operations are stored in Single Static Assignment (SSA) form such that each instruction instance has a unique variable associated with it. The execution makes not distinction between registers and memory.
Symbolic expressions are generated using the rules corresponding to each instruction in Column "Rule to Build Symbolic Expression", the symbolic expression builder builds one or more symbolic expressions for the instruction or any relevant instruction. Each symbolic expression is of the form LHS := RHS, where LHS and RHS are the left side and right side of an assignment respectively. An explicit LHS is used only for Store instructions. The LHS for all other instructions is the SSA value associated with each instruction. The concolic execution maintains a call stack so that each Ret instruction sets a value in its caller, denoted by caller, with the return value.
The symbolic expression builder uses several helper functions as described in Table II . Each of these functions generate a symbolic expression according to their description. For example, makeDeref("p") returns " * p", where * represents pointer dereference. In keeping with SSA, the symbolic expressions generated for an instruction are stored along with the instruction. In this way, the symbolic expressions associated with an instruction can easily be retrieved by referring to the instruction.
Complex Data Types. Because the patch generated by Senx is in the form of the source code of a target program, the symbolic expressions must conform to the proper language syntax of the program.
Symbolic expressions for simple data types such as char, integer, or float, are generated in a rather straightforward way. However, symbolic expressions for complex data types such as C/C++ structs and arrays are more challenging. For example, a field of a struct must be attached to its parent object, and the generated syntax changes depending on whether the parent object is referenced using a pointer or with a variable holding the actual object. Arrays and structs can also be nested and the proper syntax must be used to denote the level of nesting relative to the top level object.
To address the challenge, we include the GetElement instruction, which reads a field from a struct or an element from an array, in Senx's symbolic instruction set. The symbolic expression builder leverages the GetElement instructions and debug symbols that describe the ordered list of struct fields to construct symbolic expressions denoting access to complex data types including arrays and structs. GetElement is overloaded, but since the symbolic expression builder maintains the data type of each variable, it calls the appropriate version based on the type passed in var. To generate valid C/C++ code for a symblic expression, it retrieves the variable expression associated with var. If var is an array, it uses the helper function makeArrayOp, which recursivly generates code associated with the index argument. If var is a struct, it calls the helper function makeStructOp , which returns the name of the field in the struct. To determine whether an access to the struct is via a pointer or directly to an object, it checks witherh var is a result of a Load instructino or not, and generates the symbolic expression accordingly.
In order to build symbolic expression for complex data access involving nested complex data types, both makeArrayOp and makeStrutOp use the symbolic expression for the variable var, which can be the result of a previous Load instruction or GetElement instruction. In this way, symbolic expressions for complex data access such as foo→f.bar [10] , where foo is a pointer to a struct that has a field f and bar is an array belonging to f, can be constructed.
B. Loop Cloning
To generate a predicate for a buffer overflow vulnerability, Senx must compare the memory range a loop may write to with the size of the buffer being written. The latter is extracted by the symbolic expression builder, so we focus on loop cloning and access range analysis to describe how the memory range of a loop is calculated. Both loop cloning and access range analysis are functions in Senx that take as input a function F in the program and an instruction inst that performs the faulty access in the buffer overflow and returns the symbolic memory accesses range [A 1 , A n ] of inst. This symbolic access range can then be converted into source code and compared with the allocated buffer range in the predicate.
To see how loop cloning works, consider the example in Listing 2, which presents a loop adopted from a real buffer overflow vulnerability [11] in PHP, a scripting language interpreter. The loop features a complex loop exit condition and multiple updates to loop induction variable in that depend on the content of the buffer that in points to.
Loop cloning produces a new function F_clone, as shown in Listing 3: 1) Loop cloning clones the entire code of F into F_clone and sets the return type of F_clone to an integer integer. 2) Using program slicing, it removes all statements that are not needed to execute any of the loops inside F_clone. We note that this is applied to all loops in F_clone that enclose inst (including nested loops). 3) It removes every return statement in F_clone, and inserts statements into F_clone to compute the number of iterations I. This include the statements to initialize, increment and return I (represented by the variable count_iterations). If I is in a series of nexted loops, it is incremented in the inner-most loop. Using the while loop in Listing 2 as an example, loop cloning first clones function decode into decode_clone and changes the return type of decode_clone to int at line 1. The faulty access, inst, which can read beyond the end of the buffer, is at line line 5 in Listing 2, so loop cloning uses program slicing with line 5 and variable c and in that are accessed at line 5 as the slicing criteria. decode also has a potential write buffer overflow at line 8, but in this example, we focus on generate a predicate that will check whether in can exceed the end of the buffer it is pointing to. The program slicing uses a backward analysis and removes all statements that are irrelevant to the value of c and in at line 5, including line 2, 4 and 8.
It removes no return statements because there is none of them in decode. It then adds line 2 to define an int variable count_iterations and initialize the variable to zero. After that, it adds line 7 to increment the variable for each iteration of the loop. Finally it inserts line 9 to return the value of the variable to its caller.
The number of loop iterations can then be used to produce the symbolic access range [A 1 , A n ] of in. A 1 is set to the 
Operation
Description getExpr get the symbolic expression associated with an instruction or the name of a variable getName get the name of a variable makeDeref build a symbolic expression to denote dereference makeBinOp build a symbolic expression to denote a binary operation including arithmetic operations, bitwise logic operations, and bitwise shift operations makeCmpOp build a symbolic expression to denote a comparison including <, >, =, =, ≥, ≤ makeStructOp build a symbolic expression to denote an access to a struct field directly or via a pointer makeArrayOp build a symbolic expression to denote an access to an array element makeCall build a symbolic expression to denote a function call including the name of the function and all the arguments initial value of in. A n is set to the product of the number of loop iterations I, and the amount in is incremented by on each iteration, in this case one byte because in is of type char. Thus, the final range of in is [in,in+I * 1], where I is computed by the predicate at runtime by calling F_clone.
C. Access Range Analysis
Access range analysis takes as input a function f and a memory access instruction inst in the function, and outputs the range of the memory access [A 1 , A n ] as a pair of symbolic expressions. We use the buffer overflow caused by line 47 in Listing 1 as an example, so f is bar and inst is the memory write using pointer p at line 47.
Access range analysis computes the access range of normalized loops. Senx is based on LLVM to normalize loops, it uses LLVM's built-in loop normalization functionality, which seeks to convert the loop into a standard for loop with an initial value, upper loop bound and an increment for a loop induction variable. Extracting the access range for a single loop in this way is fairly straight forward. The main difficulty is extending this to handle nested loops. innermost_loop ← innermost_loop(inst) 5: outermost_loop ← outermost_loop(inst) 6: visited ← ∅ 7:
for l ∈ [innermost_loop, outermost_loop] do 8: iter, initial, end ←find_loop_bounds(f, l) 9: updates, visited ←find_loop_updates(l, visited)
10:
Symbolically add up induction updates 11: for var, upd ∈ updates do 12: acc{var} ← sym_add(acc{var}, upd) 13: end for 14: Symbolically denote the number of iterations of l as count 15:
upd_iter ← updates{iter} 16: count ←sym_div(sym_sub(end, initial), upd_iter)) 17: Symbolically multiply induction updates by the number of iterations of l 18: for var, upd ∈ acc do 19: if ¬is_initialized_in_last_loop(var) then 20: acc{var} ←sym_mul(acc{var}, count) 21: end if 22: end for 23: end for 24: ptr ←get_pointer(inst) 25: f irst_inst ←loop_head_instruction(outermost_loop) 26: Find the definition of ptr that reaches f irst_inst 27: acc_initial ←reaching_definition(f, f irst_inst, ptr) 28: acc_end ←sym_add(acc_initial, acc{p}) 29: return acc_initial, acc_end 30: end procedure Access range analysis is implemented for nested loops using the algorithm described in Algorithm 1. It analyzes the loops enclosing inst starting with the innermost loop and iterating to the outermost, accumulating increments and decrements on the loop induction variables including the pointer used by inst.
Access range analysis computes the access range of normalized loops. Senx is based on LLVM so to normalize loops, it uses LLVM's built-in loop canonicalization functionality [19] , which seeks to convert the loop into a standard form with a loop pre-header that sets up the initial value of a loop induction variable, a loop header that checks the upper loop bound, and a single backedge. Extracting the access range for a single loop in this way is fairly straight forward. The main difficulty is extending this to handle nested loops.
Since the loop in bar of Listing 1 can be normalized, we use it as an example of how Algorithm 1 can be applied to a nested loop. For each loop, it first retrieves the loop iterator variable and the bounds of it by calling helper function find_loop_bounds, and the list of induction variables of the loop along with the update to each of them, which we refer to as the fixed amount that is increased or decreased to an induction variable on each iteration of the loop, by calling another helper function find_loop_updates. In our example, we have iter = j, initial = 0, end = cols and j → 1, p → 1, q → 1 in updates for the innermost for loop from lines 46-48.
Algorithm 1 then symbolically accumulates the update to each induction variable to a data structure referred to by acc, which maps each induction variable to a symbolic expression denoting the accumulated update to the induction variable. As for the example, it will store j → 1, p → 1, q → 1 into acc for the innermost for loop. After that, it synthesizes the symbolic expression to denote the total number of iterations for the loop. At line 16 of the algorithm, we will have count = cols which is simplified from (cols-0)/1.
Having the total number of iterations, it multiplies the accumulated update for each induction variable by the total number of iterations. So acc will have j → cols, p → cols, q → cols after the loop from line 18 to 20 in Algorithm 1.
Once this is done, it moves on to analyze the next loop enclosing inst, which in Listing 1, is the while loop enclosing the inner for loop. As a consequence, we will have iter = q, initial = src, end = src+size and p → 1 in updates at line 10 of the algorithm, j → cols, p → cols + 1, q → cols in acc and count = size/cols at line 16, and finally j → cols, p → (cols+1) * (size/cols), q → size in acc. Note that the algorithm will not multiply the number of iterations of the loop to j because j is always initialized in the last analyzed loop, the innermost for loop.
After analyzing all the loops enclosing inst, the algorithm gets the pointer ptr used by inst and performs reaching definition dataflow analysis to find the definition that reaches the beginning of the outermost loop. As for the example, we will have ptr = p and the assignment p=dest at line 43 of bar as the reaching definition for p. From this reaching definition, it extracts the initial value of p, acc_initial = dest. Finally it gets the end value of p, acc_end = dest+(cols+1) * (size/cols) by adding the initial value dest to the accumulated update of p, (cols+1) * (size/cols) from acc. Hence it returns [dest,dest+(cols+1) * (size/cols)]. as the symbolic expressions denoting the access range [A 1 , A n ].
D. Symbolic Expression Translation
When generating predicates, sometimes the buffer allocation and size is computed in one function scope, while the memory access range or bad offset is computed in a different function scope. However, since the patches Senx generates are source code patches, the predicate of the patch must be evaluated in a single function scope. Symbolic Expression Translation solves this problem by translating a symbolic expression exp s from the scope of a source function f s to an equivalent symbolic expression exp d in a scope of a destination function f d . Senx uses symbolic translation to translate both the buffer size expression and memory access range expression into a single function scope where the predicate will be evaluated. We call this process converging the predicate.
Symbolic translation works by exploiting the equivalence between the arguments that are passed into the function by the caller and the parameters that take on the argument values in the scope of the callee. Using this equivalence, symbolic translation can iteratively translate expressions that are passed to function invocations across edges in the call graph. Formally, symbolic translation can converge the comparison between a expression exp a , the symbolic memory access location in f a and exp s , buffer size expression in f s iff along the set of edges E connecting f a and f s in the program call graph, an expression equivalent to either exp a or exp s form continuous sets of edges along the path such that exp a and exp s can be translated along those sets into a common scope.
Note that variables declared by a program as accessible across different functions such as global variables in C/C++ do not require the substitution, although the use of such kind of variables is not very common. We refer to both function parameters and these kind of variables collectively as nonlocal variables. And we refer to an expression consists of only nonlocal variables as a nonlocal expression.
Function translate_se_to_scopes listed in Algorithm 2 is the core of symbolic expression translation. It translates a symbolic expression expr to the scope of each function on the call stack stack. We illustrate how it works with the code in Listing 1. For simplicity, we use source code line numbers to represent the corresponding instructions.
To translate the buffer size involved in the buffer overflow, Senx finds that the buffer is allocated from a call to malloc at line 2 from the call stack that it associates with each memory allocation, and invokes translate_se_to_scopes with stack =[line 33, line 55], expr ="x * y+1", inst =line 2, f unc = foo_malloc. The function first converts "x * y+1" into a definition in which variables are all parameters of foo_malloc, which we call a nonlocal definition, if such conversion is possible. This conversion is done by function make_nonlocal_expr listed in Algorithm 3, which tries to find a nonlocal definition for each variable in expr and then substitutes each variable with its matching nonlocal definition. make_nonlocal_expr relies on find_nonlocal_def_for_var, which recursively finds reaching definitions for local variables in a function, eventually building a definition for them in terms of the function parameters, global variables or the return values from function calls. Note that a nonlocal definition can only be in the form of an arithmetic expression without involving any functions. In this case, the resulting expr is also "x * y+1" because both x and y are parameters of foo_malloc.
It then iterates each call instruction in stack, starting from line 33. For each call instruction, it substitutes the parameters in expr with the arguments used in the call instruction. For line 33, it substitutes x with rows and y with cols+1, respectively, by calling helper function substitute_parms_with_args. As a consequence, "x * y+1" becomes "rows * (cols+1)+1". Hence it associates "rows * (cols+1)+1" with function foo and stores the association in expr_translated, because line 33 exists in function foo. After that, it tries to convert "rows * (cols+1)+1" into a nonlocal definition in respect to foo. At this point, it halts because both rows and cols are assigned with return values of calls to function extract_int. Otherwise, it will move on to line 55 and continue the translation upwards the call stack. However, in this case, symbolic translation is also able to translate the memory access range expression from the scope of bar into the scope of foo. Thus, Senx uses symbolic translation to place the patch predicate in foo.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented Senx as an extension of the KLEE concolic execution engine [18] . Like KLEE, Senx works on C/C++ programs that are compiled into LLVM bitcode [42] .
We only re-use the LLVM bitcode execution portion of KLEE, and as described in Section III-A, implement our own symbolic execution engine. The reason is that KLEE's symbolic execution engine is optimized for path coverage, while Senx only needs to execute the vulnerable path. Similarly, KLEE's symbolic expression builder is tightly tied to its exploration engine and is not designed for easy translation back into C/C++ source code. As a result, we felt it would be easier to start with a fresh design for Senx's symbolic expression buildler.
For simplicity and ease of debugging, we represent our symbolic expressions as text strings. To support arithmetic operations and simple math functions on symbolic expressions, we leverage GiNaC, a C++ library designed to provide support for symbolic manipulations of algebra expressions [24] .
We extend LLVMSlicer [15] for loop cloning and implement our static loop analysis as separate LLVM passes [42] . To locate error handling code, we use Talos [25] . The static loop analysis makes use of LLVM's canonicalization of natural Expression Translation  451  Patch Generation  172  Total  2,543  TABLE III  SOURCE LINES CODE OF SENX loops to transfer loops into forms easier to manipulate [19] . While the static loop analysis is integrated into the concolic executor and is invoked directly from the concolic executor before the execution of a program, the error handling code locator is executed separately by a standalone tool provided by Talos.
Our memory allocation logger is built on top of the existing interpose of memory allocations in KLEE. The concolic executor extends KLEE to detect integer overflows and incorporates the existing memory fault detection in KLEE to trigger our patch geneartion. Senx also leverages LLVM's built-in pointer analysis. Table III shows the size of each component of Senx. Half of the source code is used to implement symbolic expression builder, which forms the foundation of other components of Senx. In total, Senx is implemented with 2,543 lines of C/C++ source code.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate our approach in two aspects. First, we evaluate the effectiveness of Senx in fixing real-world vulnerabilities. Second, we use a case study to illustrate in details how Senx synthesizes patches for three representative vulnerabilities.
A. Experiment Setup
We aim to evaluate Senx with vulnerabilities in popular, large, and complex real-world applications. We searched online vulnerability databases [5] , [6] , [8] , software bug report databases or developers' mailing groups [3], [10] , [12] , and exploit databases [9] to find real-world buffer overflows and integer overflows.
Our criteria to choose a vulnerability include that 1) the input to trigger the vulnerability is publicly available, 2) the program that contains the vulnerability can be compiled into LLVM bitcode and executed by KLEE, 3) the vulnerability can be reproduced via the input under Senx. We obtain the inputs to trigger our vulnerabilities from the blogs of security researchers, bug reports, exploit databases, mailing groups for software users, or test cases attached to patch commits [1] , [2] , [4] , [9] , [14] , [16] .
For each program, we first configure it to satisfy two requirements: 1) it does not have code unsupported by KLEE such as inline assembly code and some special LLVM instructions; 2) it does not use customized memory management because our mechanism to capture buffer overflows assumes that the program uses standard C/C++ memory management functions, such as malloc and free. All our experiments were conducted on a desktop with 4core 3.40GHz Intel i7-3770 CPU, 16GB RAM, 3TB SATA hard drive and 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.
B. How effective is Senx in Patching Vulnerabilities?
We use 42 real-world buffer overflows and integer overflows to evaluate the effectiveness of Senx in patching vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are from 11 applications of a variety of types including 8 tools/libraries to manipulate media files and archive files, the official interpretor for PHP programming language, the sqlite relational database engine, and a collection of programming tools for managing and creating binary programs, as shown in Table IV .
For each vulnerability of an application, we run the corresponding program under Senx with a malicious input that triggers the vulnerability. If Senx generates a patch, we first manually examine the patch and compare the patch with the official patch released by the vendor for the vulnerability if such official patch is available. Then we apply the patch to the application and run the application natively with the same malicious input to verify if the patch indeed fixes the vulnerability. We consider a vulnerability as successfully patched if it is not triggered after the patch is applied. If Senx fails to generate a patch or the patch generated by Senx fails to fix a vulnerability, we find out the cause for the failure.
Our results are summarized in Table V . The vulnerabilities are comprised of 19 linear buffer overflows, 10 non-linear buffer overflows, and 13 integer overflows. Senx effectively patches 78.6% of them.
Senx generates patches for 14 linear buffer overflows. It successfully performs loop cloning on 42.9% of them, while falling back to use access range analysis on the rest of them.
The failure of loop cloning are due to two causes. First, the program slicing tool utilized by Senx sometimes mistakenly includes instructions that are irrelvant in computing loop iterations into slices. Unfortunately these instructions calls functions that can have side-effects so the slices cannot be used by Senx. This is probably because the program slicing tool uses imprecise alias analysis that does not distinguish different fields of structs correctly. Second, for a few cases the entire body of the loops is control dependent on the result of a call to a function that has side-effects. For example, the loops involved in CVE-2017-5225 is only executed when a call to allocate memory succeeds. Senx also cannot use this kind of slices.
In all the patches generated by Senx, 23.8% must be placed in a function other than the function where the vulnerability manifests. Particularly this accounts for 46.2% of the patched linear buffer overflows. This illustrates that symbolic expression translation is essential for the success of Senx.
48.5% of the patches involve complex data access, mostly on struct fields via pointers. This indicates that it is critical for Senx to have the capability to construct symbolic expressions containing complex data access.
Senx fails to synthesize a patch for 9 vulnerabilities. Mostly because that the symbolic variables involved in the patch predicate do not converge in a single function and causes patch placement to fail. Secondly Senx cannot construct some symbolic expressions because they are dependent on the path being executed. In other words, a variable must be denoted as different symbolic expressions along different execution paths. Lastly for a couple of vulnerabilities both loop cloning and access range analysis fail.
C. Case Study
CVE-2017-5225. This heap buffer overflow in libtiff can be exploited to cause denial-of-service or code execution via a crafted TIFF image file. The overflow occurs in a function cpContig2SeparateByRow that separates input TIFF image data by rows. The function reads image data into an input buffer dynamically allocated, whose size is determined by two parameters specified inside the image data: the number of pixels (samples) per row and bits per pixel. By tampering the parameter for bits per pixel to be an invalid value that is smaller than what it supposed to be, an attacker can cause cpContig2SeparateByRow to allocate an input buffer less than the actual size of the pixel data and as a result trigger a buffer overflow when cpContig2SeparateByRow tries to read beyond the input buffer.
When Senx captures the buffer overflow via running libtiff with a crafted TIFF image file, it first identifies that the buffer is allocated using the value of variable scanlinesizein as its size and hence it generates "scanlinesizein" as the symbolic expression for the buffer size. Senx then finds that the buffer overflow is within a nested loop of three levels and the pointer used to access the input buffer is dependent on the induction variables of the loop. As a consequence, Senx classifies this buffer overflow as a linear buffer overflow and starts to analyze the loop.
Senx first tries to clone the loop and performs program slicing on cpContig2SeparateByRow with the load instruction that causes the overflow as slicing criteria. However, the slice contains a call to _TIFFmalloc, which allocates dynamic memory, because the entire body of the loop is control dependent on the result of the call. As a result, Senx cannot use the slice and falls back to conduct access range analysis on the loop. Starting from the innermost level of the loop and move outwards the outermost level of the loop, Senx identifies the induction variable of each level of the loop, the bounds of the induction variable, and the update to the induction variable, from which Senx computes the number of iterations for each level of the loop and accumulates the update to the pointer that causes the overflow. Because the value of the pointer increases by one in each loop iteration and is dependent only on the outermost level, whose number of iterations is spp and the innermost level of the loop, whose number of iterations is imagewidth, Senx generates "spp * imagewidth" as the accumulated update to the pointer from the loop.
Because cpContig2SeparateByRow reads the input buffer from its begining, Senx need to include only the accumuated update and the buffer size in the patch predicate. And it synthesizes the patch predicate as "spp * imagewidth > scanlinesizein". Senx then finds that cpContig2SeparateByRow contains error handling code, which has a label bad, from the result of running Talos and hence generates the patch as below. As the buffer allocation and overflow occur in the same function, Senx puts the patch immediately before the buffer allocation. invokes error handling, and is placed at the same location as Senx chooses. The official patch differs from the patch generated by Senx mainly in that it uses whether the parameter bits per pixel is valid or not, "(bps != 8)", as the patch predicate. From our analysis of libtiff's code, we believe that the patch generated by Senx and the official patch can both effectively thwart this buffer overflow.
CVE-2016-5844. This integer overflow in the ISO parser in libarchive can result in a denial of service via a crafted ISO file. The overflow happens in function choose_volume when it multiplies a block index, which is a 32-bit integer, with a constant number. The crafted ISO file can cause the block index to be quite large to cause the result of the multiplication to exceed 2146483647, the maximum number that can be represented by a 32-bit integer, and hence overflows into a negative number. Subsequently the negative integer is used as a file offset and causes the ISO parser to crash.
Senx detects the integer overflow when it runs libarchive's ISO parser with a crafted ISO file. It finds that the overflowed integer is the result of multiplying a constant number 2048 and a struct field variable vd→location, while the result is to be assigned to a 64-bit integer variable. So it generates the following patch that replaces the 32-bit multiplication into a 64-bit multiplication by adding a data type cast of vd→location into a 64bit integer before the multiplication. For this integer overflow, the patch released by the developers of libarchive is almost identical to the patch generated by Senx. The only difference is that the official patch uses the constant LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE rather than its equivallent value 2048 in the multiplication.
VI. RELATED WORK

A. Automatic Patch Generation
Leveraging Fix Patterns. Similar to Senx, some other automatic patch generation APR techniques also leverage fix patterns or models to generate patches.
By observing common human-developer generated patches, PAR generates patches using fix patterns such as altering method parameters, adding a null checker, calling another method with the same arguments, and adding an array bound checker [26] . PAR is able to generate patches for 23% of the 119 bugs from six Java projects. Senx differs from PAR in two aspects. First, PAR is unable to generate a patch when the correct variables or methods needed to synthesize a patch are not accessible at the faulty function or method. Second, PAR uses a trial-and-error approach that tries out not only each fixing pattern upon a given bug, but also variables or methods that are accessible at the faulty function or method to synthesize a patch. On the contrary, Senx employs a guided approach that identifies the type of the given bug and chooses a corresponding patch model to generate the patch for the bug and systematically finds the correct variables to synthesize the patch based on semantic information provided by a patch model.
Focusing on memory leak bugs, LeakFix defines a fix as the only deallocation statement for a memory chunk which must be executed after the allocation statement of the memory chunk and after any use of the memory chunk [23] . By labelling program statements related to memory allocation, deallocation, and usage, and abstracting a program into a CFG containing only those related program statements, LeakFix transforms the problem of finding a fix for a leaked memory chunk into searching for an edge where a pointer expression always points to the memory chunk can be constructed, no execution path covering the edge has a dealloction statement for the memory chunk, and no use of the memory chunk exists on the outgoing path of the edge. LeakFix successfully generates patches for 28% of the 89 reported leaks in the SPEC2000 benchmark.
SPR fixes a defect with transformation schemas [30] . For a defect, it identifies a statement in a target program as a repairing target, then selects a transformation schema, from a list of transformation schemas, to modify the statement by associating an abstract function with it. After that, it repeatedly runs the modified program to discover the correct values that this abstract function should return for both inputs triggering the defect and inputs not triggering the defect. By recording the values of all variables accessible at the identified statement, it tries to find a symbolic expression involving a subset of the variables to act as the abstract function. This symbolic expression is then used to synthesize a patch.
Using Program Mutations.
GenProg is a pioneering work that induces program mutations, i.e. genetic programming, to generate patches [47] . Leveraging test suites, it focuses on program code that is executed for negative test cases but not for positive test cases and utilizes program mutations to produce modifications to a program. As a feedback to its program mutation algorithm, it considers the weighted sum of the positive test cases and negative test cases that the modified program passes. Treating all the results of program mutations as a search space, its successor improves the scalability by changing to use patches instead of abstract syntax trees to represent modifications and exploiting search space parallelism [28] .
Based on an analysis on the patches generated by state-ofthe-art generate-and-validate APRs, including GenProg [47] , RSRepair [37] , and AE [46] , Kali generates patches that only delete functionality [38] . The analysis finds that the test suites used by those patch generators to determine whether a patch correctly fixes a bug often fail to do so because the test suites do not even check whether the patched program produces correct output. By augmenting the test suites with checks on program output, they find that the vast majority of the patches claimed to be correct by these patch generators are actually incorrect. This indicates that relying merely on test suites to verify the correctness of automatically generated patches can cause misleading results.
Applying SMT Solver. SemFix uses constraint solving to find the needed symbolic expression to repair the right hand side of an assignment statement or the condition checked by an if statement [36] . By executing a target program symbolically with both inputs triggering a defect and inputs not triggering the defect, it identifies the constraints that the target program must satisfy to process both kinds of inputs correctly. It then synthesize a patch using component-based program synthesis, which combines components such as variables, constants, and arithmetic operations to synthesize a symbolic expression that can make the target program satisfy the identified constraints.
Similar to SemFix, Angelix runs the target program symbolically with concrete inputs to discover the constraints that a target program should satisfy to fix a defect and then uses component-based program synthesis to generate a patch [33] . Different from SemFix, it considers more than one statements in a target program so that it is capable of generating a patch that modifies more than one statements in the target program.
Learning from Correct Code. Prophet learns from existing correct patches [31] . It uses a parameterized log-linear probabilistic model on two features extracted from the abstract trees of each patch: 1) the way the patch modifies the original program and 2) the relationships between how the values accessed by the patch are used by the original program and by the patched program. With the probabilistic model, it ranks candidate patches that it generated for a defect by the probabilities of their correctness. Finally it uses test suites to test correctness of the candidate patches. Like other generateand-validate APRs, its effectiveness depends on the quality of the test suites.
Unlike Prophet, CodePhage intends to borrow code from the binary code of a donor program and translate it into a source code patch for a defect in a target program [40] . A donor program is a program that reads the same inputs as the target program, and correctly handles both the input that can trigger the defect in the target program and the input that do not trigger the defect. CodePhage searches for a donor program from its list of donor programs. After finding a donor program for the defect, CodePhage searches for a check in the donor program that returns opposite values for the two inputs and considers it as a candidate check. It then runs the donor program to produce symbolic expressions that denote the check as a function that determines the values of some input fields. Finally it searches for locations in the target program where the symbolic expressions can be translated to valid source code as a patch for the target program to check against the same input fields.
The way that CodePhage borrows code from one program and translates the code into another program is analogous to the symbolic expression translation used by Senx, which instead translates between different scopes of one program.
B. Prevention of Buffer Overflows
Fortifying Program Code. One way to hinder exploits to vulnerabilities is by fortifying programs to make them more robust to malicious input. Software Fault Isolation (SFI) instruments bounds checks before memory operations to ensure that they cannot corrupt memory [35] , [44] , [48] . Alternatively, Control Flow Integrity (CFI) learns valid control flow transfers of a program and validates control flow transfers to prevent execution of exploit code [22] , [43] , [49] , [50] .
By contrast, Talos introduces the notion of Security Workarounds for Rapid Response (SWRR) and applies them to existing programs to stop malicious inputs [25] . By statically analyzing program code, Talos identifies existing error handling code and uses it to synthesize SWRRs, which can be enabled or disabled by users dynamically at runtime to thwart malicious attacks.
Rectifying Inputs. Some techniques rectify malicious program inputs to prevent them from triggering vulnerabilities. With taint analysis, SOAP learns constraints on input by observing program executions with benign inputs. From the constraints that it has learned, it identifies input that violates the constraints and tries to change the input to make it satisfy the constraints. By doing so, it not only renders the input harmless but also allows the desired data in the rectified input to be correctly processed [29] .
A2C exploits the observation that exploit code embedded in inputs is often fragile to any slight changes. By encoding inputs with an one-time dictionary and decoding them only when the program execution goes beyond the often vulnerable code, it disables the embedded exploit code and turns it into a program termination [27] .
Filtering Inputs. Alternative to rectifying inputs, some techniques detect and simply filter out malicious inputs [21] , [32] , [41] , [45] . Among them, Bouncer combines static analysis and symbolic analysis to infer the constraints to exploit a vulnerability and generates an input filter to drop such malicious inputs [21] . Shields models a vulnerability as a protocol state machine and constructs network filters based on it [45] .
VII. CONCLUSION
We present the design and implementation of Senx, a system that automatically generates patches for buffer overflow vulnerabilities. For a program that manifests a buffer overflow, Senx synthesizes a patch with a predicate to check whether a buffer overflow is about to occur and prevents the buffer overflow by steering the program execution to error handling code, similar to a patch written by human developers.
Senx leverages two novel techniques, symbolic expression translation and loop cloning, to construct a predicate. Enabled by the two techniques, Senx generates patches correctly for 33 of the 42 real-world vulnerabilities.
